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In re Application of :

JUL 1 9 2004

Coates et al.

OFFICE OF PETITIONS

Application No. 09/448,086 Filed: November 23, 1999

ON PETITION

Title of Invention:

BONE GRAFTS

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This is a decision on the petition under 37 CFR 1.137(a), and alternatively under 37 CFR 1.137(b), filed June 26, 2002, to revive the above-identified application.

The petition under 37 CFR 1.137(a) is **DISMISSED**. The petition under 37 CFR 1.137(b) is **held in abeyance**.

The above-identified application became abandoned for failure to timely reply to the final Office action, mailed August 4, 2001. The final Office action required a terminal disclaimer to overcome a double patenting rejection. The Office action set a statutory period for reply of three (3) months, and extensions of time under 37 CFR 1.136(a) were available.

Applicant filed a reply to the final Office action on January 17, 2002^1 ; however, the reply included a terminal disclaimer that was unacceptable as it was not executed by an attorney of record.

No proper reply having been received, the above-identified application became abandoned November 5, 2001. A Notice of Abandonment was mailed on May 1, 2002.

In response to the Notice of Abandonment, Applicant filed the instant petition which, in the first alternative, requested withdrawal of the holding of abandonment based upon the January 17 reply.

¹ The reply included an authorization to charge extension-of-time fees as necessary.

That request was denied in a Decision mailed December 2, 2003, for failing to file a proper reply to the Office action.

The instant petition

The instant petition requests alternative relief under 37 CFR 1.137(a), or under 37 CFR 1.137(b).

Petition under 37 CFR 1.137(a) based upon unavoidable abandonment

A grantable petition to revive an abandoned application under 37 CFR 1.137(a) must be accompanied by: (1) the required reply (unless previously filed), which may met by the filing of a notice of appeal and the requisite fee; a continuing application; an amendment or request for reconsideration which prima facie places the application in condition for allowance, or a first or second submission under 37 CFR 1.129(a) if the application has been pending for at least two years as of June 8, 1995, taking into account any reference made in such application to any earlier filed application under 35 USC 120, 121 and 365(c); (2) the petition fee as set forth in 37 CFR 1.17(1); (3) a showing to the satisfaction of the Commissioner that the entire delay in filing the required reply from the due date for the reply until the filing of a grantable petition pursuant to 37 CFR 1.137(a) was unavoidable; and (4) any terminal disclaimer (and fee as set forth in 37 CFR 1.20(d)) required pursuant to 37 CFR 1.137(c). The instant petition lacks items (1) and (3).

Petitioner must establish that petitioner treated the patent the same as a reasonable and prudent person would treat his or her most important business.

The general standard applied by the Office requires petitioner to establish that petitioner treated the patent the same as a reasonable and prudent person would treat his or her most important business. 235 U.S.C. 41(c)(1) states, "The Commissioner may accept the payment of any maintenance fee ... at any time

 $^{^{2}}$ The Commissioner is responsible for determining the standard for unavoidable delay and for applying that standard.

... if the delay is shown to the satisfaction of the Commissioner to have been unavoidable." (emphasis added).

"In the specialized field of patent law, ... the Commissioner of Patent and Trademarks is primarily responsible for the

application and enforcement of the various narrow and technical statutory and regulatory provisions. His interpretation of those provisions is entitled to considerable deference." Rydeen v. Quigg, 748 F.Supp. 900, 904, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)1876 (D.D.C. 1990), aff'd without opinion (Rule 36), 937 F.2d 623 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (citing Morganroth v. Quigg, 885 F.2d 843, 848, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1125 (Fed. Cir. 1989); Ethicon, Inc. v. Quigg, 849 F.2d 1422, 1425, 7 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1152 (Fed. Cir. 1988) ("an agency' interpretation of a statute it administers is entitled to deference"); see also Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844, 81 L. Ed. 694, 104 S. Ct. 2778 (1984) ("if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.")).

"The critical phrase 'unless it be shown to the satisfaction of the Commissioner that such delay was unavoidable' has remained unchanged since first enacted in 1861." Smith v. Mossinghoff, 671 F.2d 533, 538, 213 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 977 (D.C. Cir. 1982). The standard for "unavoidable" delay for reinstating a patent is the same as the unavoidable standard for reviving an See Ray v. Lehman, 55 F.3d 606, 608-609, 34 application. U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1786, 1787 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (citing In re patent No. 4,409,763, 7 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1798, 1800 (Comm'r Pat. 1990; Smith v. Mossinghoff, 671 F.2d 533, 538, 213 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 977 (D.C. Cir. 1982). The court in In re Mattullath, accepted the standard which had been proposed by Commissioner Hall which "requires no more or greater care or diligence than is generally used and observed by prudent and careful men in relation to their most important business." In re Mattullath, 38 App. D.C. 497, 514-515 (1912) (quoting Ex parte Pratt, 1887 Dec. Comm'r Pat. 31, 32-33 (1887)). However, "The question of whether an applicant's delay in prosecuting an application was unavoidable [will] be decided on a case-by-case basis, taking

all of the facts and circumstances into account." Nonawareness of the content of, or a misunderstanding of, PTO statutes, PTO rules, the MPEP, or Official Gazette notices, does not constitute unavoidable delay. The statute requires a "showing" by petitioner. Therefore, petitioner has the burden of proof. The decision will be based solely on the written, administrative record in existence. It is not enough that the delay was unavoidable; petitioner must prove that the delay was unavoidable. A petition will not be granted if petitioner provides insufficient evidence to "show" that the delay was unavoidable.

Applicant is further advised that the Patent and Trademark Office must rely on the actions or inactions of duly authorized and voluntarily chosen representatives of the applicant, and applicant is bound by the consequences of those actions or inactions. Link v. Wabash, 370 U.S. 626, 633-34 (1962); Huston v. Ladner, 973 F.2d 1564, 1567, 23 USPQ2d 1910, 1913 (Fed. Cir. 1992); see also Haines v. Quigg, 673 F. Supp. 314, 317, 5 USPQ2d 1130, 1132 (D.N. Ind. 1987). Specifically, petitioner's delay caused by the actions or inactions of his voluntarily chosen representative does not constitute unavoidable delay within the meaning of 35 U.S.C. 133 or 37 CFR 1.137(a). Haines v. Quigg, 673 F. Supp. 314, 5 USPQ2d 1130 (D. Ind. 1987); Smith v. Diamond, 209 USPQ 1091 (D.D.C. 1981); Potter v. Dann, 201 USPQ 574 (D.D.C. 1978); Ex parte Murray, 1891 Dec. Comm'r Pat. 130, 131 (Comm'r Pat. 1891). <u>In re Mattullath</u>, 38 App. D.C. 497, 514-15 (1912) (quoting Ex

³ <u>Smith v. Mossinghoff</u>, 671 F.2d 533, 538, 213 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 977 (1982).

⁴ See Smith v. Mossinghoff, 671 F.2d 533, 538, 213 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 977 (Fed. Cir. 1982) (citing Potter v. Dann, 201 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 574 (D. D.C. 1978) for the proposition that counsel's nonawareness of PTO rules does not constitute "unavoidable" delay)); Vincent v. Mossinghoff, 1985 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23119, 13, 230 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 621 (D. D.C. 1985) (Plaintiffs, through their counsel's actions, or their own, must be held responsible for having noted the MPEP section and Official Gazette notices expressly stating that the certified mailing procedures outlined in 37 CFR 1.8(a) do not apply to continuation applications.) (Emphasis added).

parte Pratt, 1887 Dec. Comm'r Pat. 31, 32-33 (1887)); see
also Winkler v. Ladd, 221 F. Supp. 550, 552, 138 USPQ 666,
167-68 (D.D.C. 1963), aff'd, 143 USPQ 172 (D.C. Cir. 1963);
Ex parte Henrich, 1913 Dec. Comm'r Pat. 139, 141 (1913).

Finally, a "delay (in responding) resulting from the lack of knowledge or improper application of the patent statute, rules of practice, or MPEP, [] does not constitute unavoidable delay." MPEP 711.03(c).

Applicant's Assertion

Applicant asserts that a timely reply was filed via facsimile transmission on January 17, 2002.

Analysis and conclusion

As to item (3), Applicant has not provided an adequate showing of unavoidable delay. It is the conclusion of this Office that a reasonable person in relation to their most important business would have ensured a proper reply, executed by a proper party in interest to the final Office action was filed on January 17, 2002.

Petition under 37 CFR 1.137(b) based upon unintentional abandonment

A decision on the petition under 37 CFR 1.137(b) will be held in abeyance for a determination as to whether the Amendment, filed June 26, 2002, places the application in condition for allowance.

The application file is being forwarded to Technology Center Art Unit 3738 for a decision regarding the Amendment.

Telephone inquiries concerning this matter should be directed to the undersigned at (703) 305-0014.

Derek L. Woods Petitions Attorney Office of Petitions